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3The 6th AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy:  
The Scandal of Computation - What is Computation?  
   
What is computation? Society builds and uses millions of computers each year 
so at first sight the answer seems trivial. A computer is merely a general 
purpose, typically electronic device, that can be programmed to carry out a 
finite set of arithmetic or logical operations. These days they announce their 
ubiquity to the world in phones, desktop devices, washing machines, even lawn 
mowers. 
 
 Historically, however, the etymology of the word (from the OED) informs 
us that the notion of computation was identified with the action of humans who 
make calculations, often with the aid of calculating machines. In the 1940s this 
definition was refined with that of an “effective method” (a procedure that 
reduces the solution of problems to a series of rote steps which is bound to give 
the correct answer in finite time for all possible inputs), to yield the notion of 
the algorithm an effective method for calculating the values of a function and 
the notion of the effective calculability of functions with an effective method 
(algorithmic solution). In this way, the notion of computation came to be 
identified with the actions [steps] carried out by [automated] computers to 
produce definite outputs [in finite time]. This notion frames computation in 
terms of an agent, which raises the questions of what computation is per se - 
merely the dynamics of information flow? And in this scenario, how can 
computational data be meaningful? How can meaningful data acquire truth-
values? 
 
 For a long time our ideas about computations (or about the underlying 
computational models) were more or less rigid, fixed, established in the middle 
of the twentieth century. In the centre there was the model of a classical Turing 
machine, with its scenario of a finite computation defining a fixed mapping 
from the inputs to the outputs. The computations of Turing machines served as 
a means for defining the complexity of computations, the notion of the 
universality of computations, and the notion of computability (historically, the 
lastly mentioned three notions should have been listed in a reversed order). 
Nevertheless, with the advent of modern computing technologies, networking, 
and advances in physics and biology, has emerged the ideas that computation is 
a far broader, far more common, and more complex phenomenon than that 
modelled by Turing machines. It has been increasingly more difficult to see 
newly emerging models of computations through the optics of Turing machine 
computations. Examples include biologically inspired models—such as neural 
nets, DNA computing, self-assembled structures, molecular computers, 
cognitive computing, brain computing, swarm computing, etc., or physically 
inspired models, such as quantum computing, relativistic computers, hyper-
computers, and, last but not least, “technologically enabled” models, with the 
prominent example of the Internet, but also various (also mobile) networks. 
  
 In order to further explore these and related questions, the papers in this 
Symposium cover key related issues including, but not limited to: 
4Computationalism and Neural Systems; Models of Computation; Natural 
Computing; Computation as Knowledge Generating Processes; Computational 
Complexity Theory; Quantum Computing; Trivialization Arguments; Natural 
Computation; Dynamical Systems Theory; Computation and Pragmatics; 
Dynamics of Information; Interactive Computation; Intentional and Functional 
Concepts; Hypercomputers; Pancomputationalism; Digital Systems; Type and 
Token; Computational Universe; Special Relativity; Turing Machines; 
Stochastic Diffusion Search; Monte-Carlo Tree Search; Computational 
Platform; Game-Playing; Observer-Relativity; Phenomena and Noumena. 
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Philosophy Symposium, we would like to thank all the members of the 
Programme Committee for their generous support, and for the excellent work in 
refereeing submissions. We hope that participants will find the event 
stimulating and enjoyable. 
 
 Mark Bishop (Dept. of Computing, Goldsmiths, University of London, UK) 
  Symposium Chair and AISB Chair 
 Yasemin J. Erden (Philosophy, St Mary’s University College, UK) 
  Symposium Co-Chair and AISB Committee Member 
     
 
Symposium Organising Committee: 
Slawomir Nasuto (University of Reading, UK) 
Stephen Rainey (St Mary’s University College, UK) 
Jiri Wiedermann, (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, CZ) 
 
 
Symposium Programme Committee: 
Ron Chrisley (University of Sussex, UK)  
S. Barry Cooper (University of Leeds, UK)  
José Félix Costa (IST Technical University of Lisbon, PT)  
George F. R. Ellis (University of Cape Town, SA)   
Peter beim Graben (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, DE)  
Yuri Gurevich (Microsoft Research, USA)  
Phyllis Illari (University College London, UK)  
Robert W. Kentridge (Durham University, UK)    
Jan van Leeuwen (Universiteit Utrecht, NL)     
Matthias Scheutz (Tufts University, USA)     
Oron Shagrir (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)     
Mariarosaria Taddeo (University of Hertfordshire, UK)     




Foreword from the Convention Chairs 
Ed Keedwell and Richard Everson 
 
Symposium Preface 
J. Mark Bishop and Yasemin J. Erden 
 
Rethinking Computation 
Jiri Wiedermann and Jan van Leeuwen  
 
What is a Digital State? 
Vincent C. Müller 
 
The ‘simple-minded’ metaphor: Why the brain is not a computer, via a defence of Searle 
Yasemin J. Erden 
 
Kinds and Limits of Computation 
John Preston 
 
Abstract platforms of computation 
Matthew Spencer, Etienne B. Roesch, Slawomir J. Nasuto, Thomas Tanay and J. Mark Bishop 
 
Stochastic Diffusion Search applied to Trees: a Swarm Intelligence heuristic performing Monte-Carlo 
Tree Search 
Thomas Tanay, J. Mark Bishop, Matthew C. Spencer, Etienne B. Roesch and Slawomir J. Nasuto 
 
Toward a Unified View of Computation in Neural Systems: A Reply to Shagrir and Piccinini 
Frank Faries 
 
From Proactive to Interactive Theory of Computation 
Marcin J. Schroeder 
 
Computational Complexity: An Empirical View 
Maël Pégny 
 
The Development of Models of Computation with Advances in Technology and Natural Sciences 
Gordana Dodig Crnkovic 
 
Abstract Procedures and the Physical World 
Paul Schweizer and Piotr Jablonski 
 
The scandal of the computational universe: First part: the qualitative concepts 
Michael Nicolaidis 
 




What is a Digital State?
Vincent C. Müller1
Abstract. There is much discussion about whether the human 
mind is a computer, whether the human brain could be emulated 
on a computer, and whether at all physical entities are computers 
(pancomputationalism). These discussions, and others, require 
criteria for what is digital. 1 
I propose that a state is digital if and only if it is a token of a 
type that serves a particular function – typically a 
representational function for the system. This proposal is made 
on a syntactic level, assuming three levels of description 
(physical, syntactic, semantic). It suggests that being digital is a 
matter of discovery or rather a matter of how we wish to 
describe the world, if a functional description can be assumed. 
Given the criterion provided and the necessary empirical 
research, we should be in a position to decide on a given system 
(e.g. the human brain) whether it is a digital system and can thus 
be reproduced in a different digital system (since digital systems 
allow multiple realization). 
1. MOTIVATIONS: THE COMPUTATION–
ALIST PROGRAM, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 
PANCOMPUTATIONALISM 
Given that the ontology of digital states is hardly an established 
philosophical problem, it will be useful to briefly motivate its 
discussion. A clarification as to what constitutes a digital state is 
necessary primarily in the context where digital states are part of 
a certain kind of digital systems, namely digital computers. 
There is a significant confusion over which objects in the world 
are computers because there is no agreement on the criteria; 
Shagrir calls this the “problem of physical computation” (1, 
394ff). For example, on the one hand there are the proponents of 
a computational representational theory of mind (CRM or 
“computationalism”) who believe that the human mind is a 
functional computational mechanism operating over 
representations. These representational abilities are then to be 
explained naturalistically, either as a result of information-
theoretical processes (2, 3), or as the result of biological function 
in a “teleosemantics” (4, 5). 
On the other hand, the opponents of computationalism divide 
into two camps: those who think that some natural mechanisms 
may be computers, but the human mind is not one of these, and 
those who think that all systems can be interpreted as computers 
and so the human mind is just a computer like everything else: 
“every natural process is computation in a computing universe” 
(6, 10) – this position is now often called 
“pancomputationalism” (see 7). Finally, the question to what 
extent artificial intelligence (AI) is possible, requires an 
explanation what kinds of machines computers are and what they 
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can do in principle – given that digital computers are currently 
the main kind of mechanism that is used for AI. 
So, if the brain is a computer, could we perhaps reproduce 
the brain on different hardware? If we would scan the whole 
brain of a human and run it on a (different) Turing machine, 
would it produce intelligence? (And all the other cognitive 
features of humans?) If we could emulate the brain on different 
hardware it would show the same external behavior or output as 
does the emulation of earlier software or hardware, e.g. of a 
WWII ‘Enigma’ machine or of programs that ran on some of the 
first computers, like the ‘Manchester Mark I’. 
This might be a possibility if certain conditions are met, in 
particular: “Computability: brain activity is Turing!computable” 
(8) and “At present there is no convincing empirical evidence for 
uncomputability in the brain, although there is no shortage of 
claims for it.” (9). 
Several further problems for a computational theory of the 
mind would benefit from a resolution of what constitutes a 
digital state. Within the context of the discussion of the 
computationalism mental processes are traditionally understood 
as information processing through computational operations over 
representations. Is representation a necessary feature of 
computing? If yes, perhaps something can be called a digital 
state only on presupposing mental processes in the system, so 
there is a threat of a circle here (unless we are looking at a 
feedback circle). Another is the problem of “grounding” for 
computational systems: “How can the meanings of the 
meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of 
their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other 
meaningless symbols?” (10, 335). We have argued in recent 
papers (11, 12) that a nonconceptual phenomenal content should 
be at the base of such grounding. If it were to turn out that such 
content is necessary but is analogue and cannot be present in 
purely digital systems, this would show that human cognition is 
not purely digital – and that AI on purely digital computers is 
impossible. In separate work, we argue that nonconceptual 
content is precisely non-digital content. 
I will argue in the following that being a digital state is to be 
a state of a type or category, but that we should not conclude 
from this that being a digital state is “description-dependent”. In 
particular, a state can be digital if it fulfills a particular function 
in a system of which it is a part – e.g. a representational function. 
2. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 
In a first approximation, being digital means being in a discrete 
state, a state that is strictly separated from another, not on a 
continuum. Prime examples of digital states are the states of a 
digital speedometer or watch (with numbers as opposed to an 
analog hand moving over a dial), the digital (binary) states in a 
conventional computer, the states of a warning light, or the states 
in a game of chess. Some digital states are binary, they have only 
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two possible states, but some have many more discrete states, 
such as the 10 numbers of a digital counter or the 26 letters of 
the standard English alphabet. 
2.1. Multiple Realization 
Goodman had pointed out in his early theory of representation 
that digital “marks” (physical entities) are “differentiated”, as he 
called it, precisely if they can have an exact replica: one can 
write the same letter “A” twice, since “A” is differentiated from 
any other letter. Analog marks, in contrast, are “dense”, meaning 
that for any pair of similar but non-identical marks, there is 
space for another mark in between (13, cf. 14). So, the states of 
an analog speedometer with a hand moving in analogy to the 
speed of the vehicle are continuous, just as the speed it 
represents, and for any two places where the hand can be, there 
is a third in between. 
As we already pointed out with reference to Goodman, it is 
characteristic of a digital mark that it can be realized several 
times. So, one can write the same word twice, even if one cannot 
make exactly the same mark on paper twice. John Haugeland 
usefully explains this phenomenon with games: chess is a digital 
game because we can reproduce an earlier position precisely; we 
can even resume the same game with different pieces. Billiards, 
on the other hand, is analogue, because we can reproduce an 
earlier position only to a certain degree of measured precision, 
and if we were to reproduce the same position with different 
physical objects, it would not be the same position (15, 57, 
earlier in 16). The possibility of multiple realization is a result of 
digital states being discrete: Since a white bishop in chess can be 
clearly on field C3, we can move it back to C3, or replace it with 
a different bishop; it does not matter that it is not identical to the 
earlier one, provided it is clearly a white bishop on C3. 
2.2. Discrete vs. Continuous 
But which of the two characteristics is crucial for an analog 
state, the analogy to the represented, or the continuous 
movement? 
This question becomes relevant in the case of analogous 
representations that proceed in steps, e.g. a clock the hands of 
which jump from one discrete state to another. Zenon Pylyshyn 
argues that the underlying process is analog, and this is what 
matters: “an analog watch does not cease to be analog even if its 
hands move in discrete steps” (17, 200, 18, 332 agrees). James 
Blachowicz also thinks that being on a continuum is sufficient 
for being analog, taking the view that “differentiated 
representations may also be analog – as long as they remain 
serial”, his example is a slide rule with “clicks” for positions 
(19, 71). (Note how these authors assume a functional 
description, an issue to which we shall return later.) 
These views ultimately fail to differentiate between analogue 
and digital representations. Note that the very same underlying 
mechanism could give a signal to a hand to move one step and to 
a digit to go one up (this is actually how clocks are controlled in 
centralized systems, e. g. at railway stations). In any case, some 
classic examples of digital states are clearly in a series, indeed a 
series of infinitely many steps: the series of the natural numbers. 
These two points rule out Blachowicz’ proposal to take being 
serial as a criterion. Pylyshyn, on the other hand, would 
presumably say that the underlying mechanism is already digital, 
so the clock is digital in this case – but surely there are systems 
where a digital signal is converted into an analogue one (the 
speedometer in most modern cars) and where an analogue signal 
is converted into a digital one (an analogue central clock that 
controls several digital clocks), so we should then say that the 
system has digital and analog parts. I conclude that the first 
crucial feature of a digital state is indeed that of being a discrete 
state – not excluding that of being in a series, even in a series 
that is analogue to what is represented. 
3. EVERYTHING IS ANALOGUE – AND 
DIGITAL, TOO? 
A given blob of ink on a piece of paper might be in a particular 
digital state but it has several analogue properties, too, such as a 
color, a shape, a history, a value, etc. In fact, all digital states we 
have seen so far are states of physical entities, and thus have 
analogue properties as well. (For our purposes, we can leave 
aside the question whether abstract objects can be digital.) Being 
digital is a property of certain physical entities that are also 
analogue – though they might not be analogue representations. 
But of which entities? Negroponte puts it nicely: “A bit has no 
color, size or weight, … It is a state of being: on or off, true or 
false, up or down, in or out, black or white.” (20, 14) But, which 
of the black things are in the state of being of a bit? What 
determines whether something is a bit?  
It may seem that we can just define what counts as digital as 
we please, so everything is digital. Say, for example, the two of 
us agree that if I light a fire on a particular hill that means “the 
King is out of town”. Is the hill henceforth in a binary digital 
state? Is anything not in any number of digital states, then? 
For a given physical thing (say, my desk lamp), there are 
descriptions as continuous (where is the light, what is its shape, 
what its color?) and as digital (is it on/off?), so a natural 
response is to say that being a digital state is relative to a 
particular description: Under one description the light is digital, 
under another it is not, so we have at least a “relativity of 
descriptions” (21, 29).  
This consequence is very tempting for digital computation 
and its algorithmic procedures. Alan Turing already seems to 
have already gone in this direction: “The digital computers […] 
may be classified amongst the ‘discrete state machines’, these 
are the machines which move by sudden jumps or clicks from 
one quite definite state to another. […] Strictly speaking there 
are no such machines. Everything really moves continuously. 
But there are many kinds of machine, which can profitably be 
thought of as being discrete state machines.” (22, 439). 
John Searle takes it one step further: “The electrical state 
transitions are intrinsic to the machine, but the computation is in 
the eye of the beholder.” (23, 64). Oron Shagrir concurs: “… to 
be a computer is not a matter of fact or discovery, but a matter of 
perspective” (1, 393), and about algorithms: “… whether a 
process is algorithmic depends on the way we describe the 
process.” “… processes are not really step-satisfaction 
[algorithmic]. It is simply useful to describe them this way.” 
“Whether a system is digital depends not only on its natural 
properties, but chiefly on the context in which it is described.” 
(18, 321, 331, 335).  
It now seems that not only do we have a relativity of 
descriptions, but that a description dependence of facts: it would 
then be constitutive of being a digital state that its existence is 
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dependent on contingent social interests, namely the interest in a 
particular feature that makes a digital state. To illustrate this with 
a classical example: Being ‘digital’ is more like the word 
‘constellation’ than the word ‘star’. What is part of a stellar 
constellation depends on what we make part of it. What is a star 
depends on the world and is a matter of astronomic discovery 
(cf. 21, 18, 28, 24) 
4. CLARIFICATION I: TYPE/TOKEN 
Understanding the true nature of relativity here requires some 
further clarifications. Haugeland defines as follows: “A digital 
system is a set of positive and reliable techniques (methods, 
devices) for producing and reidentifying tokens, or 
configurations of tokens, from some prespecified set of types … 
A positive technique is one that can succeed absolutely, totally, 
and without qualification; … Many techniques are positive and 
reliable. Shooting a basketball at the basket is a positive method 
(for it getting through), for it can succeed absolutely and without 
qualification;” (15, 53f). Demopoulos thus calls being a digital 
mechanism of a certain type being a member of an “equivalence 
class” (25). Harnad talks about “symbol tokens” – but not of 
types (10, 1.2). The characteristic of “multiple realization” (see 
above 2.1) is crucial, so there must be a  “positive technique” to 
produce perfect realizations that are clearly of this digital state. 
Multiple realization, however, this is not a feature of certain 
types, it is a feature of types, quite generally. For example, a 
transistor can be in a voltage state that is clearly of type “on” or 
“off”, but it can also be on the borderline between the two – it 
just so happens that our computing machines are made with 
systems that do not usually get stuck in intermediate states. 
Every digital state is also on a continuum: the digital 
speedometer might change quickly from one number to another, 
but it does have intermediate states – just that these are not states 
of numbers, not states of these types, of these descriptions. Being 
of a digital state is thus not a statistical question of whether “all 
or none” states occur often, since what counts as “all” depends 
on the type. Just looking at the physical distribution will not tell 
us anything. 
What is crucial here, therefore, is that a digital state is of a 
type. If it is of a type, then there can be multiple perfect 
realizations of it: No matter how many borderline cases a type 
happens to have (some have many, some have none), there is 
always the possibility of clear cases, and that is what is needed 
for being a digital state; we need to fulfill the implied semantic 
normativity of the “token of a type”. A digital type can be vague, 
it just needs possible clear cases. So, we require in a first 
instance that a digital state is a state that is a token of a type. 
What we need to see now is which tokens of a type are the 
digital states. 
5. CLARIFICATION II: LEVELS OF 
DESCRIPTION 
In a next step, it is helpful to differentiate at least three levels of 
description of a proposed candidate for being in digital or digital 
computational states: (a) physical, (b) syntactic and (c) semantic 
levels – something only very few people do, despite the tradition 
of functionalism (26, 57, 27, 402f, cf. 28) (29). 
The physical level (a) is that of the physical ‘realization’ of 
the computation – this is presumably what Searle had in mind 
with his “electrical state transitions” (above). 
That physical state is in (b) a particular digital state on the 
syntactic level (a binary state, or a number, a letter, a word). It is 
at this level that a particular mathematical function is computed, 
it is fully specified by specifying it on this level.  
(c) That digital state in turn may represent something else, 
e.g. a truth value, a time, or a color, let us call this the semantic 
level. What is represented at this level may, again, have 
representational functions on several levels (the color can 
represent a political opinion, etc.). 
A digital computer works because it is constructed in such a 
fashion that its physical states cause other physical states in a 
systematic way, and these physical states are also digital states 
on the syntactic level. (The physical states need not be of the 
same physical type, they can be voltages and magnetic fields, for 
example.) The semantic level is not necessarily present and is 
not necessary for the digital system or digital mechanism. 
Contrary to popular belief, a computer does not require semantic 
content to function, (e.g. 30, 31, 1414ff) and (15, 66, 32, 385). 
Given this clarification of levels, we can re-evaluate the 
understanding of digital states. The semantic level allows for a 
true relativity of facts, not just of descriptions: The same 
computer following the same algorithm can be said to compute 
different things. This is hardly surprising. For example, it may 
well be that what a computer does with the same binary 
sequence is to add two numbers or to change one letter to 
another. Whether we want to regard the binary sequence as the 
one or the other will depend on the context. So, these syntactic 
binary states can have many different contents, on a semantic 
level (just like “2 + 2 = 4” can add apples or pears). The 
semantic level, however, is irrelevant to the specification of the 
digital states, which reside on the syntactic level. – Contrary to 
popular belief, relativity on the semantic level does not show that 
there is a relativity of facts on the syntactic level. (Note that I am 
not thereby claiming that “digital state” is a natural kind, i.e. 
roughly a kind where belonging to the extension is determined 
wholly by criteria that are themselves natural kinds [recursively], 
that is, their existence is independent of any conceptual system 
that has a label for them.) 
Remember that the digital states in a system often represent 
other digital states (e.g. the binary states represent numbers), 
which relates to the discussion over whether our mental 
computation is computation over material symbols, as is writing 
down a mathematical proof. (Do I think in words?) 
6. CLARIFICATION III: A DIGITAL STATE 
IS A TOKEN OF A FUNCTIONAL TYPE 
It is useful to note that not all systems that have digital states are 
digital systems. We can, for example, consider the male and 
female humans entering and leaving a building as digital states, 
even as a binary input and output, but in a typical building these 
humans do not constitute a digital system because a relevant 
causal interaction is missing. In the typical digital system, there 
will thus be a digital mechanism, i.e. a causal system with a 
purpose, with parts that have functions. Digital mechanisms in 
this sense may be artifacts (computing machines) or natural 
objects (perhaps the human nervous system). However, it seems 
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clear that not all digital states are parts of computational 
systems: the words in this paper are digital states, but their 
function is not computational. 
If being of a type was the criterion for being digital, then 
everything would be in any number of digital states, depending 
on how it is described. However, what we really should say is 
that something is digital because that is its particular function. 
My desk lamp is always in a digital state, because being on/off is 
part of its function. The first letter of this sentence is in the 
digital state of being a “T” because that is its function – it is not 
an accidental orientation of ink or black pixels. The sun, on the 
other hand, is not in a digital state at present, though it can be 
shining or not shining at some place.  
We make artifacts where some physical states cause other 
physical states such that these are physical states of the same set 
of types, e.g. binary states. (Note that one machine might 
produce binary states in several different physical ways, e.g. as 
voltage levels and as magnetic fields.) If someone would fail to 
recognize that my laptop computer has binary digital states, they 
would have failed to recognize the proper (non-accidental) 
function of these states for the purpose of the whole system – 
namely what it was made for. The fact that a logic gate in my 
laptop is a binary state depends on whether it has that function 
and is not description dependent. (And the fact that it computes 
is crucial to its function, but not to that of, say, my shaving brush 
– so pancomputationalism seems misleading here.) 
I conclude that we should say a state is digital if and only if 
it is a token of a type that serves a particular function. 
So, the function is that determines whether something is a 
token of a type or not. The normativity of having or fulfilling a 
function generates the normativity of being of a type. The type 
has the function, being of the type allows to fulfill the function. 
(Even though we would prefer to design digital systems such that 
they have very few borderline cases and almost only clear cases, 
this is not a criterion for being a digital system.) 
 
6.1. Which Function? 
At this point, it is clear that the description dependence of being 
digital depends on that of having a function. Functions are a very 
large issue, let me just indicate why one might think that there 
may be some facts here that are not description dependent. 
In the case of an artifact, we assume a functional description. 
If the oil-warning light on a car dashboard is off, is it in a digital 
state? Yes, if its function is to indicate that nothing is wrong with 
the oil level. (It may serve all sorts of other accidental functions 
for certain people, of course.) But if the light has no electricity 
(the ignition is off), or if it was put there as a decorative item, 
then the lamp is not in a digital state “off”. It would still be off, 
but this state would not be digital, would not be a token of the 
same functional kind.  
In the case of a natural object, the allocation of proper 
function is dependent on teleological and normative description 
of systems (33, esp. 2.2) – a problematic but commonplace 
notion. The function of a human’s legs seems to be locomotion 
(and kicking balls), but we are not tempted to say that the leg is 
in digital states, while perhaps the muscle cells are – with respect 
to their function. Whether or not the legs are digital, they can be 
simulated (to an arbitrary degree of precision) on digital systems 
– only that the simulation will not walk, it will just “walk in the 
simulation”. 
The description of an artifact in terms of function is to say 
that something is a means to an end, it serves the function to 
achieve that end – a function that can be served more or less 
well. (Note that serving a function does not mean being used for 
that function; there may well be no agent that can properly be 
said to be using the artifact, e.g. if it is part of a large and 
complex system.) 
The dependence of being a digital type on having a proper 
function can be illustrated by looking at a digital information 
channel. Even if that channel is already defined as digital, it is 
not clear which parts are relevant and carry a function. For 
example, in computer security, there is the question which 
aspects of the information are used to convey information, 
searching for possible “covert channels”, for example in the time 
delays between signals (see 34). These time delays can be used 
to convey information, similar to the delays in Morse code. So, 
given a time sequence of digital signals, it is still not clear which 
digital signals are present, unless function is specified, e.g. by 
stating whether particular time delays are significant or not. 
6.2. Too many Functions, too Many Types 
At this point, we need to see whether the account so far is 
sufficient to identify the digital states. A little reflection will 
reveal that it captures the standard samples of digital states, such 
as the states inside a digital computing system, or the states of a 
digital clock or indicator. However, it is very hard to see how the 
account as stated can be prevented from incorporating all too 
many states that are, intuitively, not digital states. For example, 
it will not only include the oil indicator lamp on my dashboard, 
but any lamp. After all, whatever the proper function of a 
particular lamp may be (such as to shed light on a desk), it 
fulfills that function by being “on” and does not fulfill it when 
“off”. So, all lamps are in digital states. But so are all hats: 
Whatever the proper function of a particular hat may be (such as 
to shade the head), it fulfills that function by being “on the head” 
and does not fulfill it when “off the head”. Wherever we look, 
we seem to find functionally determined clearly discrete tokens 
of types – but the flood is too hard to stem with just the sloppy 
notion of “function” that we used so far. 
One diagnosis of the situation is the following: What we 
explained so far is really not digital type, but type in general. 
The notion of function is really necessary for any type/token 
distinction. Take the word “tree”. Which sounds or graphical 
shapes are tokens of that type? This is not just determined by 
some particular sound or graphical pattern but by whether a 
given sound or shape serves the function of being of that type. 
What is more, the type is functionally individuated: Which 
words are of the type “tree”? Those that serve the function of 
talking about trees. 
So, the notion of function is not characteristic of digital types 
only, but of types quite generally. Of course, one might want to 
say that all types are digital, but it will become clear presently 
that this would constitute a deviation from current usage. 
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7. WHICH FUNCTIONAL TYPES ARE THE 
DIGITAL ONES? 
We will discuss briefly some proposals for restricting the 
functional types to the desired digital ones. Each of these 
proposals contains a grain of truth that will be used in the final 
theory. 
7.1. Computational 
Since computational systems is what we are interested in, it 
seems natural to say that digital states are those that serve a 
computational function in a computational system. On this 
proposal, the notion of computation would be explained first, in 
formal, mathematical terms, and being digital is dependent on 
that explanation.  
It so happens that all digital states can be part of a digital 
computational system, but do not have to be. It is irrelevant for 
its being digital whether a single warning light is or is not part of 
a computational system; it is still accurate to call it a digital 
representation. A digital clock can be just the output system of a 
purely analog time-keeping device. It appears that the class of 
digital non-computational states is not empty, so we cannot use 
computation to distinguish the digital types from the others. 
(And it follows from our previous discussion of digital vs. 
discontinuous that these are cases of digital states.) Having said 
that, it is a virtue of this proposal that it stresses the formal, 
syntactic, nature of computing – a feature that we will use 
presently. 
7.2. In the System 
In specifying the function of a state, one is often required to take 
recourse to the system of which it is a part, in particular to the 
digital system. This is clearly the case in conventional digital 
computers, so could this not provide a narrowing down of the 
right functional types? 
In the case of conventional computing machines this 
proposal would work just like the one to start with “computing”– 
so there is clearly some unity here. However, if we allow 
systems to cover other systems that include the digital clock or 
warning light, how are we then going to limit the notion of 
“system” in the necessary way? It appears that a “system” will 
suffer from just the same defect as the “function” itself: anything 
is a system if it has some function or other. So, yes, all digital 
states are states in a system – but so are too many other states. 
7.3. Representational 
Perhaps we really have two notions here, the discrete states in 
general, and those discrete states that are representational, which 
we could call “digital”? 
This has two disadvantages: It explains one obscure notion 
with an even more obscure one (“representation”). More 
importantly, it restricts digital states to those that represent, 
which is just what we should not do. It is precisely characteristic 
of the digital states in our prime example, the binary digital 
computer, that they do not represent. Just being of the state is 
what allows the system to perform its operations. The basic units 
have no meaning or representation – though they can be so 
interpreted, if desired, and in various ways, as we indicated 
above. So, we should not assume that all digital states are 
representational, but we must keep in mind that many are. 
7.4. Pre-Defined 
In at least some digital systems, notably in binary computers, the 
set of digital types is an explicitly pre-defined finite set. Is this 
the characteristic feature? 
Is this necessary, however, in order to make a digital system, 
or a system with digital states? And how are they pre-defined? 
The proposal appears unnecessarily narrow, because it excludes 
digital states in systems that are not formally constructed. It 
would show a priori, for example, that the human brain does not 
have digital states (except if a creator pre-defined them). 
7.5. Syntactical 
The peculiar distinction of those types that are digital is that they 
are so devoid of content; it really does not matter at all how they 
are realized, what properties they have, provided that they are 
generally recognizable as being of the particular type. This 
aspect is probably best described by saying that digital types are 
syntactic types. A token of a syntactic type thus only contributes 
its being of that type to a larger syntactic system, nothing else. In 
particular, it cannot be said to have a meaning. In this sense, 
binary code is syntactic, and so are letters of an alphabet. 
Already words or lexemes are not syntactical, since they are 
semantically defined. Of course, lamps or hats are not syntactic 
items, so it appears that the requirement of syntactic definition of 
the type does our job to narrow down the many functional types.  
8. WHICH STATES ARE DIGITAL? 
In the case of the human nervous system, there are the questions 
whether it is a digital system on the level of mental functions, 
and whether it is a digital system on the level of cell properties 
and interactions. Many neuroscientists think of the latter in 
digital computational terms. [Piccinini now argues that “spikes” 
in neural activity do not constitute digital states. (35-37)] 
Computationalists think that representational function makes the 
mental level a digital computational system as well. Reproducing 
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